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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the evolution of the Ukraine-NATO ties since 1991. The rise 
of new states in the former USSR represents a diplomatic revolution of the first order, 
which this study analyses in part. The Ukraine is officially committed to a policy of 
neutrality, and has used its non-bloc status mainly to distance itself from Russia. It has, at 
the same time tried to develop closer political relationships with the countries of Central 
and Western Europe. At this moment, it is vital for the Ukraine to establish a special 
relationship with NATO, as well as bilateral relations with the USA. By means of this 
policy, the Ukraine may confirm its independence and sovereignty, to build a new state, 
and to integrate into the Western society. Presently the Ukraine needs to create 
constructive relations with Russia. Furthermore the relationships between the Ukraine, 
NATO, and the USA will play a very significant role in Ukraine affirming itself. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union provided many 
nations, which had been separated from the Western society during the Cold War, the 
opportunity to develop mutual cooperation with Western economic and political 
institutions. At the same time, since 1989, these events have absorbed the attention of the 
world, regarding European security and the future of the newly independent states of 
Europe. 
The Ukraine, as one of the largest states in Europe, located in the geographic 
center of Europe, and occupying an important strategic position, has a weighty role in the 
European security system. 
After its independence in 1991, the Ukraine made its historic choice to embrace 
independence, and sovereignty, augmenting a market economy, strengthening 
democracy, and integrating into the European economic and political space. 
Thus, the geopolitical situation and historical heritage of the Ukraine objectively 
determine the multi-dimensional character of the Ukrainian foreign political orientation. 
Therefore, the Ukraine started to implement a policy of neutrality between the 
West and Russia, setting a priority on relations with Western and Central Europe. The 
survival of the Ukraine as a free and independent nation, its economic and political 
sovereignty and security became the major principle of the Ukrainian strategy. A special 
relation with NATO, which became a politico-military institution and the guardian of 
democracy and human rights, and bilateral relations with USA, was vital for the Ukraine. 
IX 
After analyzing the events that took place in the period since the Ukraine's 
independence to the present, this thesis concludes that relationships with Western 
countries and NATO helped the Ukraine obtain all its aims. The special relationship with 
NATO and the bilateral relation with the USA are helping to confirm the Ukrainian 
independence and its movement to an authentic democratic society, and to confirm its 
own domestic and external abilities to maintain its security. Now it is clear that 
democracy will succeed only if the states emerging from the former Soviet Union belong 
to a European and Western political, economic, and military community. 
To consolidate democracy, and to make a more successful transition to Western 
society, the Ukraine still needs to resolve several challenges: create a more active and 
stronger political society in the country; increase the acceptance of Western society and 
NATO among its population by explaining the policies of these Western institutions and 
justifying the benefits that the Ukraine could obtain from these institutions; develop real 
economic reforms, principally a market economy capable of generating economic 
growth; and eliminate both political and civil corruption, perhaps one of the most 
complex barriers facing the Ukraine's transition. 
Only with the help of Western society, its exemplary judicial system and other 
governmental and political structures can the Ukraine battle these complex problems and 
create an authentic democratic society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.        INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE 
On December 17, 1991, the leaders of four of the Soviet Republics—Ukraine, 
Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan—met in the Belovezskaya Forest in Belarus and made 
an unprecedented announcement: the Soviet Union comprised of 15 Republics no longer 
existed as a unified entity. It was one of the most important events in the twentieth 
century. The collapse of the USSR was hailed by the west as a victory for freedom and a 
triumph of democracy over totalitarianism. With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the 
dismantling the "iron curtain" and the establishing a market economy gave the newly 
created states from Eastern Europe an opportunity to embrace the Western political 
institutions. In addition to these sweeping changes, the breakup of the Soviet Union 
transformed the entire world political situation, leading to a complete reformulation of 
political, economic and military alliances all over the globe. The dissolution of the Soviet 
system had been a painful and complicated process for many nations, but this particularly 
applied to Ukraine. Aside from Russia, Ukraine was the largest republic in the Soviet 
Union in terms of population and territory, as well as in overall economic importance. 
Ukraine produced about 25 percent of the Soviet GNP and 21 percent of its 
agricultural output. Strategically, for Russia, the "loss of Ukraine" implied the loss of 
important strategic territory, an army of hundreds of thousands of troops, as well as the 
lost of the best tanks and other military equipment, which were, for obvious reasons, 
stationed mainly in the western regions of the Soviet Union. Apart from these economic 
and strategic factors, Russia and Ukraine were also closely linked culturally and 
ethnically. For example, Russia's historical roots trace back to Kievan Rus, the princely 
empire that ruled Eastern Europe from the tenth to the thirteenth century.1 Therefore, the 
"divorce" between Ukraine and Russia was a very complicated process, which created 
dangerous situations and was a major threat for Ukrainian independence. 
On the other hand, Ukraine's unwillingness to join the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and its determination to join the European Union (EU) and 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), increased effective economic and political 
institution, yet also increased Russia's fears that the "near abroad" will become a strategic 
"front line," isolating Russia. Therefore, Ukraine, officially committed to a policy of 
neutrality. It has used its non-bloc status mainly to distance itself from Russia, and has at 
the same time tried to develop closer political and security relationships with the 
countries of Central and Western Europe. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the developing relationship between 
Ukraine and NATO, in light of security, sovereignty, and support in developing a 
democracy in the young state. Naturally, the attention of the international community was 
drawn to Ukraine because it lies between NATO and Russia. 
In 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were allowed to join NATO. 
Ukraine welcomed this accession, as it would strengthen security and stability in the 
European   Continent.   Ukraine,   consistently  moving   closer  to   Western  European 
1
 K. Loken, T. Bukkvoll, Ukraine: Social Conditions, and History, Available [on line] 
[Http://www.prio.no/html/osce-ukraine.htm], December 2000 
organizations, took advantage of this opportunity to improve significantly its relationship 
with the West. 
Over this period (1991-2000), Ukraine has greatly shifted its view of NATO and 
its security policy. Ukraine also has not opposed NATO's expansion, yet it claimed this 
process should be evolutionary. Ukraine also felt that NATO had to harmonize with such 
neighboring countries as Russia and Ukraine. From Ukraine's viewpoint, Ukraine would 
develop her security through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. At this point, Ukraine advocated building pan- 
European security institutions, especially the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), the main pillar of the new European security architecture. Ukraine 
saw that NATO would be a positive factor for this institution.2 
After the Russian Duma (Parliament) and politicians called into question 
Ukraine's sovereignty (especially Crimea and Sevastopol statues in 1993) and after some 
Russian government officials suggested using economic pressure to boost Ukraine's 
integration policy within the CIS, Ukraine placed NATO at the center of its security 
policy.3 
Ukraine noticed that NATO was changing from a defense organization to a 
political-military institution, molding itself into a guardian of democracy and human 
2
 Yaroslav Bilinsky, Endgame in NATO's Enlargement, "Evolution in the Views of the Ukrainian 
Government" Westport, Connecticut 1999, p.31-34 
3
 Yaroslav Bilinsky, Endgame in NA TO's Enlargement, "Russian Moves against Ukraine." Westport, 
Connecticut 1999, p.37-39 
rights. This seemed to guarantee that NATO would not harm other states. Furthermore, 
the earlier idealism regarding the OSCE was replaced by a more realistic approach to 
NATO. At this moment, it was vital for Ukraine to establish a special relationship with 
NATO and at the same time a bilateral relation with the USA. In the negotiation process, 
Ukraine strongly asked NATO for security assurance or "associate status." In the 
document called the "NATO-Ukraine Charter," NATO gave vague security assurance to 
Ukraine. 
Ukraine is presently developing a specific security policy regarding NATO and 
Russia. Economic factors play an important role in Ukraine's security policy since its 
independence. After Russia launched its price liberalization in January 1992, Ukraine 
chose to abandon the Ruble zone in order to establish its own national economic policy. 
Yet, Kiev realized that Ukraine could not run its economy without Russia's inexpensive 
energy and vast market. Therefore, Ukraine switched its orientation to Russia, but 
claimed that this integration was limited to economics. 
Thus, Ukraine was obligated to advance a policy of neutrality and a policy of 
balance between two opposing directions: the integration to the West by developing a 
close relationship with NATO as a guarantor of it security, and developing a good 
neighbor relationship with Russia. This policy has allowed the nation to maintain its 
independence and sovereignty. 
4Ibid.,pp.39-43 
Furthermore, the positive image of Ukraine in the international arena ensues not 
from its economic or military power but from its neutral diplomacy. That is, its positive 
imagine has ensued from its "bridge-diplomacy," and denuclearization. Secretary-General 
of NATO Xavier Solana in 1996 called Ukraine "Europe's Linchpin" and "strategic pivot 
in Europe." 
B.       IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC AND METHODOLOGY 
This topic is important for several reasons. First of all, since Ukraine's location is 
a highly strategic geopolitical space in Europe, it is indeed "Europe's linchpin" and 
"strategic pivot in Europe." 
As a result, Ukrainian independence is a defining feature of the European security 
architecture. Ukraine and its relations with Russia are determinant in forming Russia's 
future. Ukraine would assume a role as a bridge between NATO and Russia. Another 
point that, Ukraine might be a serious candidate for ethnic conflict and separatism, which 
could provoke serious consequences for European security.5 Therefore, its special 
relationship with NATO and its bilateral relation with the USA are helping to confirm 
Ukrainian independence. Ukraine's transition to a genuine democratic society confirms its 
own domestic and external abilities to maintain its security. As a result, a politically 
stable Ukraine at peace with its neighbors is fundamental to peace and stability in 
Europe. 
5Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, "Introduction," The Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1997, pp. 1-3 
Of the various related issues that this thesis explores, the following four stand out 
as central: 
• What are the influences of Ukrainian history on its modern policy? 
• What are the origins of Ukrainian policy of neutrality or balance between 
two superpowers? 
• Why are the Ukrainian internal and external policies and its political 
condition so important for European society? 
• Why was nuclear disarmament an extremely important step in confirming 
Ukraine's independence and democratic consolidation? 
Methodology Employed. This thesis analyzes official documents of NATO, the 
USA, Russian and Ukrainian governments. The thesis also relies upon both published and 
unpublished theoretical papers and documents about NATO, NATO's enlargement, and 
Ukrainian and Russian policy. 
Chapter II details the primary points of Ukrainian history, the collapse of the 
Soviet empire and Soviet camps, the inception of Ukraine's independence in December 
1991, and Ukraine's role in the Post-Soviet space. This Chapter also reviews the 
historical influences that molded Ukraine's modern policy, as well as it future strategic 
and evolutionary goals. 
Chapter III analyzes the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. An analysis of 
the chronology of events reveals what conditions and influences shaped this relationship. 
This Chapter also explores    Ukraine's participation in the "Partners for Peace" (PfP) 
program and the importance of this program as a mechanism of transformation. Through 
this partnership, Ukraine and its Armed Forces moved closer to NATO and the West. 
Chapter IV examines the difficulties inherent in developing a relationship 
between the United States and Ukraine, particularly negotiating about nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, this Chapter highlights the relations between Russia and Ukraine and further 
highlight the importance for these two nations, which share a common historical heritage 
and mutual problems, to cooperate and to coexist. 
Chapter V summarizes and concludes the research. The thesis concludes that 
Ukraine is an independent state, developing a new democracy, gradually integrating into 
Western political, economic and security structures. Ukraine's union with NATO will 
continue to play a crucial role. For a more successful transformation to the West and for 
a smooth transition to democracy, Ukraine needs to resolve several complex and 
challenging issues. First, it must reshape its political society. Secondly, it must increase 
loyalty among the population to Western policy, especially to NATO and the USA. It 
must also develop economically by initialing real economical reforms. To achieve such 
economic goals, it must establish a balanced economic relationship with Russia. Finally, 
with the help of Western countries, especially the USA, Ukraine must find ways to uproot 
the corruption that undermines it hopes for consolidating its democracy. 
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II. INDEPENDENT UKRAINE IN EUROPE 
A. END  OF THE  COLD  WAR:  BEGINNING  OF A NEW EUROPIAN 
SOCIETY 
1.   Key Historical Issues In Ukrainian History 
The end of the Cold War (1989), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
disappearance of the Warsaw Pact removed the totalitarian pressure from over half of 
Europe and gave many nations and countries the opportunity for autonomous 
development. It also gave a chance for cooperating with Western economic, political and 
security institutions. 
Yet, simultaneously, these events created problems in this region of Europe. 
These problems included economic and social difficulties, ethnic tensions (e.g. Balkan 
region) and border disputes (e.g. Ukraine and Romania.) All of these issues affected 
European security, and the security of all the newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union. Ukraine, from the first moment of its independence in 1991, faced these 
problems too. Before analyzing all of the events that transpired and created the problems 
listed above, one must ask some basic questions. Indeed, to begin, one might even ask, 
"What is Ukraine? Why was it one of the first republics that sought independence from 
the Soviet Union, Why was its desire for independence one of the most serious issues for 
the 'new' Russia?" There are more questions that may seem odd to pose, but, in fact, two 
questions exist that have been asked so frequently that they are nearly cliches. "Who are 
these Ukrainians and what do they want?" Even native Ukrainians are frequently 
exasperated when they try to answer these two questions. 
The Ukrainians are an ancient people of at least 47 million worldwide, or 59 
million, if all of their descendants are included. Ukraine today has a total population of 
approximately 51.3 million. Of this number, ethnic Ukrainians comprise approximately 
73 percent and Russians 22 percent or 37 and 11 million, respectively.6 
According to Mykhaylo Hrushevsky—Ukraine's greatest historian and president 
of the short-lived Central Rada government of the Ukrainian Republic in 1918—the exact 
origin of the Slavic people is unknown. It can be assumed that the Slavic people existed 
long before they were mentioned in Roman historical records in the 1st century A.D. 
Slavic history, and at the same time history of the Ukrainian people, began with the 
rumble of hooves when the Scythians dominated the steppes of north of the Black Sea 
from the 7th to the 4th centuries B.C., initiating centuries of outside political and cultural 
domination. A very strong Slavic tribe, the Wends, developed in the 4th century; their 
settlements extended from modern central Ukraine up to the Baltic Sea. 
The Ukrainians' period of historic glory was in the Middle Ages, when Kiev was 
the capital of the Kievan Rus. The first people to unify and control this area for a long 
period were the Scandinavians, known as the Rus. The Rus took Kiev, and by the late 
10th century the city was the center of a unified state known as Kievan Rus, which 
stretched from the Volga west to the Danube and south to the Baltic (the territory of 
modern Russia, Byelorussia, and Ukraine).   Prince Oleg established the Kyivan Rus 
6
 Yaroslav Bilinsky, Endgame in NATO's Enlargement, "Ukrainians-Who Are They?" Westport, 
Connecticut 1999, p.20 
7
 Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, "History of Ukraine," Available [on line] [http://www.ozemail.com.au.history], 
January 2001 
10 
proper in 879. He conducted military expeditions to the shores of the Caspian Sea and 
raided Byzantine cities. Prince Igor, who not only continued external raids but also had to 
fight insubordinate tribes of Ulitchs and Derevlans, followed him, in 912. In 988, the next 
Kievan Rus prince Volodymyr Grate accepted Christianity from Constantinople, 
beginning a long period of Byzantine influence over Kievan politics and culture. In this 
period, the area was one of the most powerful states of medieval Europe, and Kiev was 
one of the richest and the most developed capitals at that time.8 The modern Ukraine 
inherited the National Blazon and the appellation of the national currency from that 
period. 
Unfortunately, in 1240, Kiev fell into a prolonged period of decline because the 
Tatar-Mongols captured it. By the fourteenth century (1360) the Kievan Rus lost its 
independent statehood, insofar as it is possible at all to speak of independent states in the 
Middle Ages, and by 1520 the Ottoman Empire started to control all of coastal Ukraine. 
Military devastation and plague had wiped out much of the population of the 
Ukrainian steppe by the 15th century, when the region became popular with runaway 
serfs and Orthodox refugees escaping more tightly controlled neighboring domains. 
These people came to be known as kazaks (Cossacks). At this time, Ukrainian Cossacks 
formed a state—it was the Cossacks Republic—Zaporizka Sich. From this moment, for 
the Ukrainian people, long numerous struggles for independence started. 
Zaporizka Sich was constantly attacked by Polish and Lithuanian armies from the 
West and North, and by Turks from the South.  The Cossacks Republic to preserve its 
8
 Academician Peter Tolochko, Ethnic History of Ancient Ukraine, Institute of Archeology of Ukraine 
2001,pp.5-34 
11 
independence and freedom created, from time to time, temporally alliances with one side 
or with another. From 1648 to 1654 the Ukrainian Herman (military and state leader), 
Bogdan Khmelnytsky, sought the protection of the Moskovite (Russian) Tsar, and in 
1654 signed the Pereyaslav Treaty—military union of Ukraine and Russia. After these 
events, Ukraine fell under the domination of the Russian Empire, which was rapidly 
gaining strength. After the Russian Tsar, Peter the Great, won the war against the 
Swedes on the Ukrainian territory (near the city of Poltava), Ukraine became a Russian 
province. The Western part of Ukraine, then fell under Polish, Austro-Hungarian and 
Rumanian Domination.9 
Ukrainian nationalism flourished in the 1840s, prompting Russian authorities to 
ban the Ukrainian language in schools, journals and books. Following WWI, and the 
collapse of tsarist authority, Ukraine finally gained its independence, but civil war broke 
out and the country quickly descended into anarchy, with six armies vying for power and 
Kiev changing hands five times in one year. 
In January 1918 Ukrainians availed themselves of an opportunity and proclaimed 
the Ukrainian People's Republic, but it existed for only two years. Mykhail Hrurushevsky 
was the first President of the Ukrainian People's Republic. He was a prominent scholar, 
but unfortunately not a politician. Council of Ukraine participated in the peace 
negotiations in Brest Litovsk and concluded a separate peace agreement with the Central 
Powers (Germany and Austro-Hungary,  1918). After prolonged fighting involving 
9
 Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, "History of Ukraine," Available [on line]: [http://www.ozemail.com.au.history], 
January 2001 
12 
Russia, Poland and various Ukrainian political and ethnic factions, troops of the Central 
Powers that support the extremist nationalists led by Pavlo Skoropaski, Poland retained 
portions of western Ukraine and the Soviets obtained the rest. Ukraine officially became 
part of the USSR in 1922.10 
When Stalin took power in 1927, he made a test case out of Ukraine for his ideas 
about "harmful" nationalism. In 1932-33 he engineered a famine in the USSR that was 
most severe in Ukraine and killed as many as 7 million Ukrainians. Executions and 
deportation of intellectuals further depopulated the country. Stalin also went after the 
country's premier religious symbols, its churches and cathedrals, destroying in Ukraine 
over 250 buildings. During the purges of 1937-39, millions of other Ukrainians were 
either executed or sent to Soviet labor camps.11 WWII brought further devastation and 
death, with 6 million perishing in the fighting between the Red Army and the German 
Wehrmarht. It's estimated that during the first half of the 20th century, war, famine and 
purges cost the lives of over half the male and a quarter of the female population of 
Ukraine. 
In 1990, the Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring won local seats 
across the country. In July ofthat year, the parliament declared sovereignty. "After the 
failed Soviet coup in August 1991, the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was banned, 
and on December 1, in an independence referendum, 90.3 percent of the population voted 
10
 K. Loken, T. Bukkvoll, Ukraine: Social Conditions, and History, Available [on line]: 
[Http://www.prio.no/html/osce-ukraine.htm], December 2000 
11
 See "Case Studies: Persecution/Genocide," The Human Rights Series, vol.III,NY:The Universety of the 
State of New York, 1986. 
13 
for Ukrainian independence, and 61.6 percent voted for the first Ukrainian president 
Leonid M. Kravchuk."12 Independence was the most important event in several centuries 
of Ukrainian history. Finally, Ukraine regained its sovereignty, which it had lost such a 
long time ago. 
Leonid Kravchuk, former chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine's 
Republic (CPU), was elected as the first president of Ukraine. Unfortunately, 
factionalism forced the government's resignation in September of 1992, and 
disagreements with Russia over Ukraine's cache of inherited nuclear weapons and the 
control of the Black Sea fleet (harbored in the Crimean port of Sevastopol) strained 
relations between the two countries. 
Meanwhile, skyrocketing inflation, fuel shortages and plummeting consumer 
power plagued the country and exacerbated regional and ethnic differences. The reformer 
Leonid Kuchma beat Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential election. The CPU benefited 
from the political and economic turmoil, capturing a substantial majority of parliamentary 
seats in the 1994 elections. In the late 1990s, new tensions arose between Ukraine and 
Russia over Ukraine's closer ties with NATO. 
In sum, Ukrainian people achieved their age-old wish, but they needed to create 
everything anew, in order for Ukraine to assume its historical place in Europe as an 
independent state. 
12
 Yaroslav Bilinsky, Endgame in NATO's Enlargement, "Ukrainians-Who Are They?" Westport, 
Connecticut 1999, p.20 
14 
Historically, Ukraine's location, considered special and attractive, during its long 
and difficult history, many times lured other tribes, kingdoms, nations, and later countries 
to occupy it. As a result, Ukraine has often been invaded and attached to the invader's 
territory. At least during three periods in its history, the Ukrainian people had an 
opportunity to establish an independent state and to try to keep its people safe by 
adopting a policy that was similar to its present foreign policy. Several times, Ukraine 
enjoyed conformable political situations, but it lost its independence again and again. 
Now the world wondered, "Could the young Ukrainian state survive as an independent 
and sovereign European country or would it lose its independence again?" This question 
appeared again in 1991, and for this reason the young state focused its attention on the 
Western society, hopefully. 
2.  Role of Ukraine in the Post Soviet Space 
To better understand the role of Ukraine in the post-Soviet space, one must 
describe the role of Ukraine in the USSR (1920-1991). Before the disintegration of the 
USSR, Ukraine played an important role in the Soviet Union. For example, Ukrainian 
agriculture served as the main supplier of the Soviet Union's food to the point that it was 
labeled, "the breadbasket of the Soviet Union." In addition, more than one-third of the 
Soviet military industrial complex was located on Ukrainian territory, and nearly 20 
percent of the Soviet Union's products were manufactured in Ukraine. A considerable 
part of soviet transit, particularly pipelines and electric power networks to Europe, passed 
through Ukraine. The Ukrainian industrial and agriculture complex were significant parts 
of the Soviet economy, but unfortunately, all these economic and agriculture structures 
15 
could successfully work only inside of the entire economic system of the country, and not 
work independently. Because, for example, energy is a crucial sector of the economy, and 
in this sector Ukraine is highly dependent on supplies from Russia. 
After the collapse of the Soviet empire, Ukraine became the second-largest state 
in Europe, with a population of 52 million. Ukraine has a vast and strategically situated 
territory, rich natural resources, a powerful industrial and scientific potential, a highly 
developed transport system and convenient transit routes. Indeed, among the newly 
independent states, Ukraine occupied a special place and possessed numerous national 
attributes. 
Beyond these attributes, Ukraine's existence enhanced the security of Poland by 
reducing a traditional dilemma that Poland had always faced, namely threatening powers 
existing simultaneously on its western and eastern frontiers. Ukrainian's existence also 
enhanced the security of Romania, which is far safer today than when it bordered the 
Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. Ukraine also enhances the security of Turkey, 
which, in fact, has made Turkey much more confident in dealing with its neighbors. 
Ukraine's geography even closes off, in effect, Russia's significant geopolitical access to 
the Mediterranean region.14 
Ukraine's independence definitely alters the politics of the space formerly 
occupied by the Soviet Union. Without an independent Ukraine, the CIS would just 
resemble another empire, with a new name. This empire would be dominated by Russia, 
13
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which still controlled Ukraine. In effect, this would only be an imperial entity clothed in a 
new guise. Instead, today Ukraine's statehood defines the CIS in a fashion that 
significantly differs from Russia's conceptualization. Ukraine's approach to the CIS 
offers the prospect of enhancing the security of the newly independent states of the CIS. 
With Ukraine's new presence on the European map, Russia can begin to redefine itself 
and answer the fundamental question: "Will Russia become a normal European state or 
will it be a multinational empire?" 
After its independence, Ukraine was considered an important player in the future 
of European society. As previously mentioned, Ukraine has been labeled, a "European 
linchpin." According to T. Bukkovoll, three important factors have given Ukraine this 
pivotal role: 1) Ukrainian independence is a defining feature of the future European 
security architecture, 2) Ukraine is a crucial determinant in forming the future Russia, 3) 
Ukraine is considered a potential candidate for serious ethnic conflict and separatism. 
The existence of an independent, non-aligned Ukraine creates a stabilizing 
geographical distance between Russia, on the one side, and east central and Western 
Europe on the other. If that distance were to disappear, the consequences for European 
security politics could be serious. The present NATO policy of not deploying nuclear 
weapons and foreign combat troops on the territories of the prospective NATO members 
16
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in eastern and central Europe might have to be revised if Ukraine came under Russia's 
control, and Moscow seized the opportunity to station troops in Ukraine. 
Similarly, if NATO accepted Ukraine as a member, Russia might deem this a 
strategic loss of such major proportions as to warrant military action to halt it. Regarding 
such a situation, Michael Mandelbaum has said, "It is not an exaggeration to say that 
NATO expansion will be good or bad depending on its effect on the peaceful coexistence 
of Ukraine and Russia."19 
If Russia is unwilling to accept Ukrainian independence and tries to subordinate 
it, the inevitable conflict will hamper its democratization, because only a totalitarian 
regime might keep an unwilling Ukraine in a position of subordination. As a result, an 
aggressive authoritarian Russia dominating Ukraine could become a troublesome 
negotiating partner for the rest of Europe, and to be sure, even the entire world. 
Obviously, the negotiation of future security arrangements for Europe, in this situation, 
could be jeopardized. 
Tor Bukkvol's third point involved Ukraine's deep ethnic, cultural, and economic 
divide. Truly, this is a vast problem. Historically, Ukrainian regions have taken shape 
under different political circumstances, demographic pressure and religious orientation. 
The "Great Divide" between ethnic Russian and the "Russified" east, and the Ukrainian- 
Poland-Hungarian west could threaten the state, if the Ukrainian government ignored this 
fact.   Therefore, in his inaugural address, President Kuchma underscored the potential 
18Ibid.,p.i 
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dangers arising from the ethnic divisions in the country, "We must understand that 
Ukraine is a multiethnic state. Any attempts to ignore that fact threaten a deep schism and 
the collapse of the idea of Ukrainian statehood." 
His predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, justified key foreign economic and security 
policies, particularly his compromises on the CIS, as a way of avoiding the emergence of 
"two Ukraine's." The need to ensure a balance between different regions and ethnic 
groups has loomed large on every important political issue in Ukraine from constitutional 
and legal change to economic and political reform. 
In the event of ethnic conflict or separatism in Ukraine, only negative 
consequences for its own security, as well as for the rest of Europe would ensue. 
Inasmuch as an ethnic conflict in Ukraine could easily involve Russia in an interstate. In 
short, owing to the three factors that Solana pointed out, Ukraine with its geopolitical 
situation and its historical place on the map of Europe will continue to play an important 
role in Europe. Without question, "A political stable Ukraine at peace with neighbors is 
fundamental to peace and stability in Europe." 
As a result of the above points, Kiev has always understood the need to cultivate 
political, moral, and material support for its independence by establishing a relationship 
with the West, yet simultaneously develop or create normal relations with Russia. 
20
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U.S., Western European, and especially NATO support substantially improves 
Kiev's chances for overcoming its two major strategic challenges, consolidating a secure 
and prosperous state, and normalizing its relations with Russia. 
B.       NEUTRALITY AS A KEY POINT OF UKRAINIAN STRATEGY 
1.  Main Goals of Ukrainian Strategy 
Optimizing the building of the nation while promoting the transformation 
processes in Ukraine demands a clear vision of the role and the place for Ukraine in the 
contemporary world. This vision together with a consistent analysis of the dynamics of 
Ukraine's interaction with the international community could create the basis for a 
resolute geopolitical strategy for Ukraine's future.23 Today, the problems of forming and 
implementing this national strategy, defining its geopolitical priorities and its vital 
national interests exactly, and making the political elite aware of the Ukrainian role and 
place in the global geopolitical realm are becoming core imperatives and decisive factors 
in Ukraine's historical and political future.24 A clear definition in the public consciousness 
of basic geopolitical priorities and national interests is one of the most important 
preconditions for developing an effective external and internal political strategy for the 
future. Unfortunately, these interests and priorities have not been consolidated in the 
national Ukrainian consciousness, nor have they even been adequately developed and 
defined on the state level during the first years of independence. As John F. Kennedy 
rightly said, "The national interest is more important than ideology."   Likewise, as H. 
23
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Morgenthau, the father of political realism, stressed, "The point of departure of the 
foreign policy of any country should be the concept of national interests defined in terms 
of power." Forming a relatively stable, non-contradictory and self-coordinated system of 
national interests and geopolitical priorities is the indispensable precondition for 
optimizing the state building processes and elaborating an effective foreign policy 
strategy for Ukraine.24 
The geopolitical situation and the historical heritage of Ukraine objectively 
determine the multidimensional character of Ukrainian foreign political orientations. 
Nevertheless, this multidimensional element should not appear as a lack of principles and 
an attempt to ride two horses, moving in opposite directions, at once. Moreover, this 
deep-rooted desire to compromise and to maintain a balance between opposing forces is 
nothing new for Ukraine. Historically, this has occurred several times, and as a rule, with 
unfortunate endings (e.g. the last period of the Kievan Rus, the Zaporizska Sich 15th 
century, and the Ukrainian People's Republic 1918). Simultaneously courting opposing 
powers and balancing on contradictions are dangerous and have always proven to be an 
effective temporary tactic but a poor long-term strategy. 
By gaining its independence in August 1991, Ukraine started to implement a 
policy of neutrality, and from the beginning, Kiev favored relations with Western and 
Central Europe, as well as the United States and Canada. Coupled to these relations, 




countries, which Ukraine has treated as "strategic partners." Coinciding with a so-called 
policy or strategy of "negation" in Kiev at that time, which hoped to rapidly establish 
distance from Russian's domination, Ukrainian officials have always used the term 
"strategic" as a synonym for "equivalence" in its relations with its Eastern neighbors. 
Contrarily, according to Russian interpretation, "strategic partnership" always meant 
closer and cordial relations with CIS states. To Russia such "normalization" is a decisive 
and crucial factor for establishing and maintaining stability in Europe. 
Rejecting efforts to recreate any framework of the former USSR brand of 
cooperation, Ukrainian leaders have put an important emphasis on developing its 
relations with Central European states. Nevertheless, since late 1991, Ukraine has felt an 
ongoing disappointment concerning the character and degree of support Ukraine can 
expect from these countries. In 1991, the West, generally speaking, opposed Ukraine's 
independence. "This was demonstrated not only by U.S. President George Bush in his 
"Chicken Kiev" speech, in which he condemned "suicidal nationalism" and averred that 
freedom and independence were not the same."25 Douglas Hurd, then British foreign 
secretary, delivered in March 1991 in Kiev one of the clearest warnings about what he 
called "destructive impulses of old nationalism" and stopped just short of stating that he 
opposed the idea of Ukrainian independence. The German Foreign Ministry and French 
President Francois Mitterrrand uttered similar warnings. Diplomatic recognition of 
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Ukraine and the establishment of diplomatic relations with it did not occur until Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned on 25 December 1991.26 "The recognition by the 
European Community and the USA of Ukraine as an independent state finally took place 
... after months of patronizing remarks and demands made by the West," commented 
Serhiy Holovatyi. 27 Immediately following this independence, for the first time, the 
young Ukrainian diplomacy did not have access to influential circles and lobbies in 
foreign offices, parliaments and political parties in Western Europe. The only question 
that really interested or worried the West at that time was "What would happen to the 
nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union?" 
Aside from the disappointment of securing partners in Central Europe, Ukraine's 
relations with Western Europe during 1992-1993 were also depressed. While Kiev has 
consistently attempted to balance Russia by cultivating alternative ties with the West, 
Western leaders in turn were careful not to antagonize Russia and therefore provided 
Ukraine with only the narrowest political and financial support. All these factors have 
continually fueled the domestic debate on the fate of nuclear weapons on Ukraine's soil. 
From 1991, more than any other Soviet successor state, Ukraine's foreign policy was 
tangled with security issues for both the country's leadership and the international 
community. Confirming its independent, sovereign status in Europe was very important 
for Ukraine during this period. Likewise, equally important was confirming its relation 
26
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with European countries, the USA and Canada in hopes that this recognition by the West 
might guarantee Ukraine's nationality and statehood. At the same time, Ukraine aspired 
to estrange itself from Russia, which desired to once again control Ukraine. Therefore, 
Ukraine adopted a policy of neutrality and tried to balance between the West and Russia. 
By adopting such a policy, Ukraine hoped to obtain its main aim: reaching full 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, political stability, and economical 
prosperity. 
Only after this period of neglect did the West begin to recognize Ukraine's 
significance and its potential role in European affairs. A discernible Western policy shift 
toward Ukraine first began to emerge in 1994, but this shift in the Western position 
toward Ukraine was clearly prudent and reserved.29 After 1994, the political-situation 
changed and as Ukraine started to develop a firmer relationship with the West, 
(sometimes very successfully), the West had to reconsider its official policy. 
2.   Evolution of Ukrainian Strategy 
National Security Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin, a leading adviser to 
President Leonid Kuchma, has signaled in 1997, that Ukraine is now rethinking its 
official policy of neutrality. Horbulin said in his letter to the parliamentary Foreign and 
CIS Relations Committee, which was made public, that Ukraine's "absolute neutral and 
non-aligned status" could be viewed "only conditionally." He added that Ukraine's 
29
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"sensitive geopolitical position" makes full neutrality impossible and that although 
Ukraine has not officially considered applying for NATO membership, it reserves the 
30 
right as a member of the UN to join any political or military union. 
The survival of Ukraine as a free and independent nation in the contemporary 
world with its fundamental national interests intact, its economic and political 
sovereignty and socio-cultural identity secure should become the major principle of 
Ukrainian strategy in achieving its national interests. Another immense task is 
transforming Ukraine from being an object or a pawn in the geopolitical games of "Super 
Powers" into an independent actor that defines its own goals and its own behavior 
(Naturally, taking into account both its own possibilities and welfare and the welfare of 
the international environment). 
Ukraine's constitution describes its foreign policy as a means of "ensuring its 
national interests and security." The latter is outlined, identified and assessed by the 1997 
Concept of the National Security of Ukraine. The national interests and objectives of the 
state security policy include: 
• Elevating living standards; 
• Improving social security; 
• Reforming the national economy; 
30
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• Enhancing the efficiency of government structures; 
• Strengthening the civil society; 
• Fighting corruption; and, 
• Protecting national resources. 
However, an important distinction, which is characteristic for today's assessment 
of national interests, was introduced at an early stage: "The commitment to neutrality and 
non-alignment must not prevent [Ukraine] from a comprehensive participation in the all- 
European security architecture."32 The concept of National Security does not explicitly 
endorse the principle of neutrality. Representatives of the executive branch, the most 
prominent representative being the president, have repeatedly stated that NATO 
membership would serve the country's national interests better than a further non- 
alignment policy. 
The new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Anatoliy Zlenko, at a conference 
in Kiev on January 25, 2001, made several essential points for the future efforts of his 
Ministry. He said that developing the strategic partnerships with the USA and Russia, 
consolidating relationships with Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, and 
Belorussia, and consolidating partnerships with Germany, Great Britain, and France are 
the necessities by which Ukraine must confirm its place in European space. Other key 
points are the accession of Ukraine into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 




future policy are deepening and confirming the relationships with NATO, and seeking the 
realization of Ukrainian initiatives into the OSCE and other regional structures. These 
are, according to Zlenko's speech, the key points of the Ukrainian foreign policy for the 
year 2001.33 
In short, Ukrainian external and internal policy resulted from a policy of full 
neutrality from the first stage of Ukrainian statehood, which helped the young state 
survive. After that challenging beginning, this policy was transformed under the 
influences of the international situation. Following these events, the concept of securing 
Ukraine's vital national interests led the nation to embrace an "only conditional" and 
"neutral and non-alignment status," which allowed Ukraine to apply to NATO and to 
reserve the right as a member of the UN to join any political or military union. These last 
points are vital for Ukraine's future development in the political and economical sphere. 
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UKRAINE AND NATO 
A.        CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS. 
A "security earthquake" shook Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Limited crises reappeared and began to haunt Europe, making NATO look outward and 
to take steps to project stability, so its new mechanism became "cooperation." Since 
Ukraine's independence at the end of 1991, NATO has been the Western institution 
concerning Ukraine the most. From the onset of Ukrainian independence, the primary 
question was, "Will Ukraine remain an independent state?" NATO has played an 
important role in ensuring that the answer to this important question "yes." Why does 
NATO hold such an important position in the mindset of Ukraine? The answer to this 
question is that of all the Western's institutions, with which Ukraine is developing closer 
relations, NATO is the most reliable and capable pillar of European security.35 
Relations between Ukraine and NATO began when Ukraine joined the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council, and then later in 1994, Ukraine joined the Partnership for 
Peace program (PfP). In July 1997, NATO leaders and the Ukrainian President signed a 
"Chapter for a Distinctive Partnership between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
Ukraine." According to this Charter both sides committed themselves "to further broaden 
34
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and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, 
which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and 
Eastern Europe."36 The NATO-Ukraine Charter has opened new vistas of cooperation, 
providing a firm basis for the further dynamic development of this relation. The most 
concrete result of the Charter was creating the NATO-Ukraine Commission, a forum in 
which Ukraine meets with the 16 NATO allies for consultations on a broad range of 
political and military cooperation activities. (The Commission has met twice at the level 
of Foreign Ministers, once at the Defense Ministers' level, and periodic meetings take 
place at the level of Ambassadors.) The consultations have covered such issues as 
strengthening cooperation in peacekeeping, creating a Joint Group on Defense Reform 
and the implementing a Joint Group on Civil Emergency Planning. 
The Ukrainian Mission to NATO, including a military representative, has been 
established in 1997, and Ukraine was represented in the Partnership Coordination Cell 
(PCC) at Mons, Belgium.37 On the military side, the Ukrainian military representative to 
NATO assumed his duties in January and soon after that, a NATO liaison officer was 
posted to Kiev. This allow Ukraine to elevate its military ties with the Alliance, 
providing opportunities to learn more about each other's armed forces and for Ukraine to 
gain useful experience relevant to reforming the military.38   On December 16, 1997, a 
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memorandum of understanding on Civil-Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness 
was signed between Ukraine and NATO. 
Ukrainian has made significant contributions to international peacekeeping 
activities in participating in the Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR). In the summer 
of 1992, the Ukrainian military were among the first to don "blue helmets" and to execute 
the missions assigned to them in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In December 
1996, UKRBAT was included into IFOR to support the Dayton Agreements. 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia consists of a mechanized infantry battalion and 
helicopter squadron. From early 1999, the UKRBAT operated as a part of the SFOR. 
Recently, Ukrainian peacekeepers, representing 11 rotations, secured their area of 
responsibility (400sg.km.) in the area of Bosnian. This area is a crossroads for Muslim, 
Croatian and Serbian interests. This area also contains the vitally important Mostar- 
Sarayevo highway. The UKRBAT forces secured the only available bridge over the 
Neretva River and executed other assigned missions. Also in the UN force in Eastern 
Slovenia, Ukraine took part in the International Police Task Force and the creation of a 
joint peacekeeping Battalion with Poland. Although this contribution in Bosnia has now 
ended, Ukraine is now providing troops and airmen to the UN-Mandated KFOR 
peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. 
In the UN force in Eastern Slovenia, Ukraine took part in the International Police 
Task Force. Since April 1994 until 1995, 550 servicemen, belonging to 2nd Ukraine's 
Special Battalion (UKRBAT-2), have been successfully fulfilling missions assigned by 
UN Command.     Clearly, UKRBAT-2 contributed much to the history of Ukrainian 
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peacekeeping. In particular, thanks to the singular efforts of the Ukrainian military, losses 
of civilians were minimized during the Croatians offensive operation "Storm" conducted 
inJulyl995.39 
Since independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has not only pursued the goal of 
integration into European and transatlantic institutions, but has sought to contribute to 
security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. First of all, Ukraine has initiated political 
and economic reform at home. Despite the political and social diversity of Ukrainian 
society, Ukraine has managed to implement these reforms exclusively through peaceful, 
civilized means, with no ensuing mass riots, clashes or by resorting to force against 
political opponents during this transition. Second, Ukraine has participated in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad. Third, Ukraine has set an 
unprecedented example for the world by eliminating nuclear arms. 
The historic importance of Ukraine's unprecedented decision voluntarily to 
renounce its nuclear weapons and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non- 
nuclear weapon state should not be underestimated. The significance of the complete 
withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory and the contribution this 
represents to reducing the nuclear threat and to creating common security space in 
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Europe was duly noted in the 1996 Lisbon Summit Declaration of the Organization for 
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 40 
This far-reaching partnership does not necessarily mean that Ukraine is seeking to 
join the Alliance, at least at this stage. Truthfully, Ukraine is not yet ready to become a 
NATO member, both in terms of meeting the necessary criteria (first of all economic) 
and in terms of altering the public's perception in Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, during the first three years, the government paid minimal attention 
to economically developing the nation. Now Ukraine is facing a severe economical 
crisis. Ukraine's foreign debt stands at $12 billion, (of which $3.1 billion is due to be 
paid next year) while the National Bank's reserves total $1.3 billion. The government's 
"domestic" debt in unpaid wages, pensions, and social benefits totals $2.5 billion. Some 
80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and real unemployment stands 
at 25 percent. 41 In this situation, stabilizing the national economy is a problem 
compounded by the heavy burden of repairing the damage from the Chernobyl disaster, 
which has become the most difficult environmental and economic problem for Ukraine 
today. Therefore, in light of all of these complex issues serious political and economic 
support and assistance for Ukraine from the international community would be an 
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investment in creating and stabilizing a democratic Ukraine, just as such support would 
assist any other country in the whole of Europe. 
Unfortunately, despite this successful beginning in building close relations with 
the West and NATO, the inception of the Kosovo crisis (in 1998-1999) undermined this 
bond temporarily. Although Ukraine had courted the favor of the West and NATO, the 
Kosovo crisis generated the first serious split between Ukraine and NATO. All 
parliamentary deputies in Ukraine agreed to unilaterally oppose NATO's campaign of 
bombing Kosovo. In addition, in April 1999 the Rada (Parliament) adopted a resolution 
against NATO's actions. It also called for the dismissal of those Ukrainian officials who 
advocated a pro-West foreign policy (such as former Foreign Minister Tarasyuk), for the 
suspension of the NTDC activities, for the recalling of the Ukrainian Mission to NATO in 
Brussels, and for an end to Ukraine's participation in the PfP. 
However, none of these drastic steps took place. On the contrary, President 
Kuchma even attempted to mediate a settlement of the conflict during NATO's 50th 
Anniversary Summit in Washington. Ukraine's attendance at the summit in the wake of 
strong anti-NATO sentiments at home and in Russia clearly demonstrated the Ukrainian 
executive's commitment to maintaining and enhancing positive relations with the 
Alliance. 43   Nevertheless, while Ukraine's leadership has not changed their views on 
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NATO after the Kosovo crisis, the public perception of NATO has worsened, according 
to a poll conducted in mid 2000 by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political 
Studies. During the last three years the number of Ukrainians considering NATO an 
aggressive military bloc has tripled and more than half think that Ukraine should never 
join it. NATO's military intervention in Kosovo even increased anti-NATO feelings in 
western Ukraine, a region that used to be solidly pro-NATO. After Kosovo, Western 
Ukrainians now have as negative a view of NATO as Crimean.44 In this situation, it is 
important that government structures working with NATO (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Emergency Planning, etc.) provide the 
necessary information about their tasks. 
The Ukrainian media failed to explain, and continues to do so, the government's 
NATO policy. It was the role of the media to fully explain the advantages, the 
importance and the policy needed for Ukraine to develop relationships with NATO, the 
EU, the WEU, the OSCE and other Western structures and organizations. This could 
have helped people better understand the modern political situations and to create a more 
politically active society in the country. 
After these events and the Kosovo crisis, perhaps it was highly significant that the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is NATO's decision-making body, in its dual 
capacity as the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), met in Kiev in March 2000. This 
was the first time the NAC ever held its summit outside the territory of its member-states. 
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This decision can be interpreted in several ways, including NATO's desire to demonstrate 
outright support for Ukraine, or perhaps even more importantly, it can be seen as a 
warning to Russia that NATO, seeking to expand its influence in the region, is eager to 
attract Ukraine to the Western camp.45 In preparation for the NAC-NUC meetings, the 
Rada ratified the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which determined the legal status 
and provided the necessary legal protection of NATO countries* forces. Further, the Rada 
also ratified the Open Skies Treaty, which allowed its signatories to conduct supervisory 
flights over each other's territories. The ratification of these agreements can be viewed as 
an indication that a majority of Rada deputies are intent on furthering cooperation with 
NATO, even in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict.46 The creation of these two 
agreements has also resulted in the removal of many practical barriers to the partnership. 
The more important of these barriers have been economic, which was evidenced 
when often and without warning, the Ukrainian MoD was forced to cancel planned 
military activities with NATO and bilaterally with the US due to a lack of adequate 
financing. Even today Ukraine often expects NATO to pay entirely for such events 
because Ukraine cannot cope with its share of the finances. Another barrier is the NATO 
and Ukrainian bureaucracies which both seem to be operating without any clear-cut 
strategic objectives with regard to each other.  Still another problem that inhibits 
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communication and resolving issues is that knowledge of Ukraine in the West and of the 
West in Ukraine remains limited. 
Finally, on many occasions it has become clear that NATO and Ukrainian 
officials are not talking to but rather around one another, which highlights the 
divergences in their diplomatic tactics and practices and thus their overall approach to 
each other on a political level. 
Overall, NATO and Ukraine need to learn how to understand each other better, 
and this will take time, patience, and forward-looking goals. 
B.        PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINE IN THE PARTNERSHIR FOR PEACE 
PROGRAM * 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program was started in January of 1994. The main 
goal of this program was increasing stability and security throughout Europe. The basic 
aims of this program were laid out in 1994, and they continue to be valid now. They 
include the following: 
• Increasing  transparency   in  national   defense   planning   and   military 
budgeting; 
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• Ensuring democratic control of national armed forces; 
• Developing Partner country forces that are better able to operate with 
those of NATO members. 
Many experts consider the PFP a permanent feature of the European security 
architecture, the biennial program, in which Allies and Partners participate. This program 
is quite significant because the process of "self-differentiation"—one of the key 
principles of the PFP—allows the nations to choose activities from the PFP that support 
their national policies and interests, and meet their specific requirements in accordance 
with their financial means.47 Since its inception at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the 
Partnership for Peace program has undergone an enormous change. For the first time, 
some countries in the CEE saw the PfP as a palliative to enlargement of NATO breadth, 
but the PfP actually moved non-NATO members beyond the point of a dialogue and into 
a genuine, practical partnership. At this time, the PfP developed a framework and 
process; it established the norm that partners should be "contributors" and marked a shift 
from purely multilateral dialogue to bilateral (partner and Alliance) relationships in the 
form of Individual Partnership Programs (TPPs) and self-differentiation. It established a 
wide sphere of cooperation to include the Planning and Review Process (PARP), 
48 transparency, civil control or oversight of the military, and peace support operations. 
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After the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the PfP became more relevant and 
operational because the PfP and a second PARP cycle was enhanced. The role of the 
partners increased in the daily work of the PfP, particularly with the establishment at 
several NATO headquarters of Partnership Staff Elements, whereby NATO and Partner 
officers are integrated in international staff functions on a permanent basis. In 1997, the 
NATO Allies decided to enhance the PfP by giving it a more operational role. This 
decision was made partly on the basis of experience gained through the multi-national 
cooperation that has taken place through peacekeeping missions in Bosnia: IFOR and 
SFOR. This in turn provided greater involvement of the partners in decision-making and 
the planning process, and strengthened its dimension of political consultation. 
This enhancement of the PfP was built on the following three elements: 
• A Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations; 
• An expanded and adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP); and 
• Enhanced practical military and defense-related cooperation covering the 
full spectrum of cooperation in PfP49 
This enhancement also marked the introduction of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC)—which replaced the NACC—and the creation of the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the NATO-Ukraine Commission to keep Russia 
and Ukraine engaged in the partnership. 
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Ukraine was the first CIS state to join the PfP in February 1995 and has remained 
an enthusiastic member ever since. Since 1995, Ukraine has been one of the most active 
participants in the PfP and its program, "The Spirit of PfP," organized by individual 
NATO member states (the USA). Ukraine, at the end of 1999, had taken part in 200 PfP 
events and 12 drills. Ukraine's military cooperation within "The Spirit of PfP" has been 
very extensive with the UK and USA in naval, peacekeeping, army, counter-terrorism 
and airborne exercises. From 1996 to 2000, Ukraine was the country with which the UK 
had the largest bilateral military program in Europe. Ninety activities were conducted 
each year with the military, with border troops and with the National Guard forces. 
The annual exercises, "Sea Breeze" in Odessa, which was organized by the US, 
attracted upwards of ten NATO and PfP countries. National Guard troops exercised 
"Guard-Partnership" between the U.S. and Ukraine have also undertaken in Ukraine and 
then in the U.S. The first Ukrainian-British peacekeeping exercises, "Cossack Express," 
took place at the Yavoriv training ground in western Ukraine in September 1999. Earlier 
joint British-Ukrainian-Polish exercises, "Cossack Steppe," took place at the Stanford 
training area, Norfolk, England. The Yavoriv military training ground in Western 
Ukraine, one of the largest in Europe, was the first former military facility from the 
USSR leased by NATO in 1999 for the PfP exercises. The annual "Peace-Shield" PfP 
exercises took place in July 2000 at this facility. This exercise was attended by 1,400 
military personnel from 20 NATO and PfP members. The exercises focused on practicing 
common procedures for the conduct of UN-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping 
missions. The largest naval, air and amphibious exercise, "Cooperative Partner-2000," 
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yet conducted by NATO in the former USSR took place in the Black Sea in June of 2000. 
In this exercise, ten NATO member states and six partner countries (Russia declined an 
invitation to take part) participated. Fifty naval ships were involved, including those 
from the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and from NATO's 
newly created "Maritime Mine Countermeasure Force Mediterranean" (MCMFORMED), 
as well as thirty aircraft, forty armored vehicles and 5,500 personnel. 
The exercises, "Cooperative Partner-2000," were designed to promote a common 
understanding of NATO Peace Support Operations doctrine and training. Here 
multinational staffs of allied and partner countries practiced the planning of operations by 
assimilating command, control and communications procedures, and advancing the 
interoperability of maritime and amphibious NATO and partner forces. Nearly 900 
Ukrainian marines were involved. 
NATO also encouraged bilateral military co-operation between Poland and 
Ukraine, which was supported by the UK, in creating a joint peacekeeping battalion. The 
battalion was sent in March to serve in Kosovo under NATO command and represents 
the battalion's first mission abroad. At present, the Ukrainian element in the unit includes 
270 soldiers and 20 internal troops. Polish Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski and 
Ukraine Defense Minister Olexandr Kuzmuk outlined a three-fold purpose of the unit. 
First, it contributes to European security, forms a link between Ukraine and NATO, and 
provides training for Ukraine's troops within NATO's Military Reform Aid Program. 
Ukrainian and Polish troops are also to be deployed side by side on the Lebanese-Israeli 
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border as part of UNIFIL. The 650-strong Ukrainian contingent is composed of engineer 
troops. 
The introduction of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative in 1994 added a new 
dimension to the relationship between NATO and its Partner Countries, enabling 
practical military cooperation in accordance with the different interests and potentials of 
the participating countries.50 Robust participation by Ukraine in the PfP, which provides 
programs of practical defense-related activities involving Allies and Partners, offers 
Ukraine enormous opportunities to assess its defense establishment, and thus to help it 
better define its role in Europe. In tandem with this defense role, the Allies would 
welcome Ukraine's increased involvement in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), which metaphorically speaking is the political "roof over the PFP. 
C.        THE IMPORTANCE OF PFP-UKRAINIAN RELATIONSHIP 
The geopolitical position of Ukraine is such that the question of forming the 
nation's external policy in relation to European security becomes crucial. In fact, 
without doubt, it is the key point of its policy. An objective analysis shows the 
developing relationships between Ukraine and NATO, the present NATO enlargement 
proposal could expand the stability zone in Europe. The NATO area is now the most 
stable region in Europe, and close relations with NATO could mean enlarging this region 
50
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of stability.   Secondly, the NATO enlargement could lead to closer relations between 
Ukraine and Western Europe. Such relations in the political and economic spheres could 
allow Ukraine to develop a broader range of relations and reduce the strong orientation 
to the CIS.51 If Ukraine cannot create a bond with NATO, and if relations between 
NATO and Russia are not normalized or other variants are found, Ukraine will find itself 
virtually surrounded by two possibly hostile powers: NATO from the south and west, 
and Russia from the north and east. History shows that such a situation is likely 
dangerous, even for a stable country. For Ukraine, which is in the early stages of state 
building, and enduring an economic crisis, this position between "hammer and anvil" is 
extremely dangerous. In such a situation, each side could continually try to play the 
"Ukrainian card" against each other.52 Therefore, Ukraine (according to its Declaration 
of Sovereignty) is independent of all blocs and neutral. Many types of neutrality are in 
evidence around the world, yet for Ukraine, the issue of neutrality has little bearing on 
whether it should enter NATO or not. According to its policy and its constitution, 
Ukraine's main goal is achieving full sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, 
political stability, and economic prosperity.  Ukraine, as an independent entity, has the 
inalienable right to apply to NATO for membership, as well as the right to join any other 
political or military union it deems essential in moving it toward achieving its national 
goals. 
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Many traditionally neutral countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland) 
are now studying the possibility of ending their neutrality, regarding it as a remnant of the 
Cold War. After World War II, these little countries' neutrality had considerable military 
and political significance because it allowed them to stand aside from military 
confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. With the disintegration of the USSR 
and the reduction in military confrontations in Europe, the politicians of these countries 
now understand that their neutrality can keep them outside the processes of world 
integration and could lead to significant economic and political losses. Integration in the 
world is no longer necessarily on military lines, but can be based on economic, political, 
religious, ethnic, geographic or some other factors. So, while these countries want to 
preserve military neutrality, they do not want to observe economic and political 
neutrality. 
Ukraine's bond with NATO could provide stability and assistance, so Ukraine 
could consolidate domestic reforms, improve relations in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE), and integrate with the West. Such a bond with NATO could benefit the 
emerging democracy in Ukraine by creating a stable environment in which the nation 
could consolidate its democracy, establish economic reforms, institute a market economy, 
and reform the military. Of course, close relationships among Ukraine and NATO, the 
EU, and the WEU will also depend in part on Ukraine's efforts to improve relations with 
their neighbors in the CEE. 
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NATO could also help Ukraine achieve its main goals of integrating with the 
West. Senator Lugar wrote, "Membership in NATO is a way to strengthen the domestic 
forces' committed to democracy and market economies." 
East-Central Europe's democrats thoroughly understand that democracy will 
succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic, 
and military community. The West, too, previously understood this link, as demonstrated 
by the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western 
democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membership 
helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece 
and Turkey. Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented prior to 
alliance membership should remember that the need for a stable security framework is 
greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened. 53 The inclusion in the EU and 
the WEU will be helpful for Ukraine, but only NATO is the preeminent security 
institution and only NATO membership provides American security assurances. 
Therefore, the bond between Ukraine and the USA it another important factor, which 
plays a special role in the Ukrainian step toward true democracy. 
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IV. RELATIONS AMONG UKRAINE, THE USA, AND RUSSIA, 
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
UKRAINE AND NATO 
A. RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE UNITED STATES 
Relations between the United States and Ukraine, formally established in January 
1992, a month after Ukraine's referendum on independence, have developed rapidly 
since the two sides resolved their deadlock over nuclear disarmament. 
Kiev is now a frequent stop for senior American officials. The U.S. and Ukraine 
have formed a bilateral commission headed by the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma 
and then United States Vice-President Al Gore to tackle outstanding foreign policy, 
security, and economic issues. Since then, Ukraine has become a leading recipient of 
U.S. foreign assistance. In October 1996, the two nations declared their relationship a 
"strategic partnership." Yet, the course of U.S.-Ukrainian relations has not always run so 
smoothly. In the first two years "nuclear" issues dominated and crowded other questions 
off the agenda. 
After that, the Kosovo crisis was the first serious split between Washington and 
Kiev. But, that conflict was mediated during NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in 
Washington, and the ratification of two very important agreements can be viewed as an 
indication that a majority of Rada's (Ukrainian Parliament) deputies are intent on 
furthering cooperation with NATO and USA, even in the aftermath of this conflict. 
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Before examining the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian ties, it is useful to remember what 
a little foundation had been laid before them. One U.S. official viewed Ukraine's 
declaration of sovereignty and its subsequent moves to separate Ukraine from the USSR 
with shock and horror. President Bush delivered his warning against "suicidal 
nationalism" in Kiev, in his speech, just three weeks before the events that led to the fall 
of the Soviet Union.54 
From the first dialogues between the USA and Ukraine, the nuclear issue was the 
primary basis for developing their relations. At that point, everything revolved around 
that dramatic and monumental topic. Many critics said that the most successful U.S. 
policy approach toward Ukraine, namely—mixing incentives for expanding political 
relations and economic reform with a continued firmness on nuclear disarmament— 
should have been tried from the beginning, not after nearly two years of 
misunderstanding and mutual recriminations.55 If these relationships had developed 
normally, the nuclear issue could not have been indefinitely postponed during the first 
phase of discussions. According to Sherman W. Gamett, these relationships had three 
phases. The first phase entailed declarations and romanticism on the Ukrainian side and 
great anxiety on the part of the West: this phase lasted from 1990 until mid 1992. Kiev 
had great expectations, both moral and material, of global support.  Western leaders on 
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the other hand, feared the impending collapse of the Soviet Union, (they trusted President 
Gorbachev); after that they also feared a fearsome conflict between Ukraine and Russia. 
Precisely, at this time, President Bush in a speech in Kiev cautioned about the dangers of 
"suicidal nationalism," which was really occurring in Ukraine at that time. 
The second phase of U.S.-Ukraine relations began with the signing of the Lisbon 
Protocol (Spring 1992) and ended with the U.S.-Ukrainian- Russian Agreement in 
January 1994. Ukraine became a part of START I. Of course, what appeared to the West 
to be the end was merely the beginning for Ukraine. Ukraine coming face to face with 
the realities of statehood: economic hardship, regional tensions, and a new relationship 
with Russia over possession of the Black Sea Fleet was reaching its first real hurdles. 
The third phase of relationship building concerned the implementation of 
Ukraine's nuclear commitments and the broadening of U.S.-Ukrainian ties. This phase 
started with the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994 and ended in June 1996 with the 
removal of Ukraine's last nuclear weapons. In the beginning, the nuclear issue 
dominated the U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Unfortunately, the first group of specialists 
knew a great deal about nuclear weapons but little about Ukraine. The Ukrainian side was 
also hampered by its lack of expertise on this specific issue. 
Ukraine, however, did have at that time a small but talented group of officials, 
often with experience in the Soviet Ukrainian Diplomatic Service. Outside the upper 
reaches of the president's staff, the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense, 
56 Ibid., p.l 14-115. 
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positions were filled with inexperienced and sometimes unimaginative officials.  All of 
these factors complicated the first steps in the U.S.-Ukrainian relations. 
The U.S. side was continually frustrated by the lack of decentralization on the 
Ukrainian side and by what it considered "technical matters." For the Ukrainians, 
however, there were no technical matters that were not somehow connected to strategic 
decisions about the Ukrainian security policy and the consolidation of the Ukrainian 
state. In many respects, U.S. policy toward Ukraine still rides on the momentum created 
by nuclear disarmament. The most important topic was the security. 
This period of nuclear disarmament had three key policies: 
• The spring 1993 Lisbon Protocol, protocol to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) with Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan (those states on whose territory strategic nuclear weapons of 
the former Soviet Union were located); 
• The response to the Ukrainian Parliament's conditional ratification of 
START-1 in November 1993; 
• The conclusion of the Trilateral Agreement in January 1994. 
During  this  phase  (from  mid-1992  until  the  conclusion  of the  Trilateral 
Agreement in January 1994), U.S. assistance was not only money well spent, it was also 
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vital to support a process of disarmament and vital national interests of all nations 
involved.57 
To the relief of many people both internally and externally, the last Soviet 
warhead left Ukraine in mid-1996, and Ukraine formally acceded to the nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a non-nuclear weapon state and received a set of security 
assurances from the NPT Depository States. During this intense period, U.S.-Ukrainian 
relations appeared on the verge of collapse several times. Yet at crucial moments, the 
U.S. Ukrainian and Russian negotiators found the right mixture of compromise. The 
Ukrainian government, prodded by critics in the Ukrainian Parliament, stressed that 
during the nuclear disarmament meetings, Ukraine should required real negotiations 
about economic and security conditions.58 President Kravchuk said that Ukraine should 
have "appropriate compensation" for nuclear disarmament and, in addition, "certain 
guarantees" for its security. On February, Rada formally postponed the considered 
ratification of START I.59 
In Ukraine itself the process of nuclear disarmament became entangled in a power 
struggle between the President, the Prime minister and the Parliament. The nationalistic 
opposition especially put President Kravchuk under enormous pressure. The main reason 
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for the protracted and contradictory process of the denuclearization of Ukraine can be 
seen in the fact that the nuclear weapons in Ukraine reflected the problems of nation and 
state building and really were a topic of internal debate. This debate was characterized by 
conflicting views of the future foreign and security policy orientation of Ukraine. One of 
the most important driving forces that led to this process was Russia's threatening 
perception of the Ukrainian actors. Ukraine really wanted to secure the fragile 
independence of its new state, which is also why they demanded security guarantees, and 
a compensation for the fissile material in the nuclear warheads and economic assistance. 
Neither the United States nor Russia really considered the security fears that 
existed in Ukraine. Instead they quickly found a common interest in the denuclearization 
of Ukraine. This was fuelled by their own fears of a proliferation of fissile material, 
related technology and "know-how" on the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
In January 1994, Ukraine still had an estimated: 
• 1,656 nuclear warheads on its territory, carried by 120 SS-19 missiles (at 
two sites), 
• 46 SS-24 missiles (silo bases, one site collocated with SS-19s), and 42 
nuclear bombers (22 Tu-95s, each able to carry 16 AS-15 air-launched 
cruise missiles, ALCMs), 
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20 Tu-160s, (each able to carry 12 AS-15 ALCMs).60 
Washington's "Russia-First" policy and the focus on only diplomatic pressure as 
well as the tensions in the difficult Ukrainian-Russian relationship further heightened the 
perception of the big threatening northern neighbor. 
According to interviews with former Ukrainian decision-makers, such as Leonid 
Kravchuk, Boris Tarasyuk and Anton Buteiko, we can see that the denuclearization of 
Ukraine was unavoidable due to the technical reality of the nuclear weapons themselves. 
Clearly, from the beginning, Ukraine was "damned" to give up the nuclear weapons 
stationed on Ukrainian territory because Kiev was technically dependent on Russia for 
spare parts. 
These spare parts, such as tritium capsules or spare parts used for the refueling of 
the heptyl in the SS-19s, were necessary in order to maintain the weapons systems and to 
guarantee their technical security. The exchange of these spare parts also had to be done 
within certain time frames. 
Moreover, Kiev was unable to control or even to use the nuclear weapons, for the 
central control and command system was based in Moscow. Furthermore, the withdrawal 
of the tactical nuclear weapon— the only weapons that could actually have been used— 
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from the territory of Ukraine within the framework of the Bush-Gorbachev-Initiatives 
had already started while the Soviet Union still existed. 
Only a small group of technical and military experts in Ukraine were aware of 
these facts. However, they did not have any influence on the decision-making process. 
Besides that, most politicians were not competent enough to understand the complex 
nature of the nuclear weapons. The main decision-makers though seemed to be able to 
evaluate the technical implications connected to the nuclear weapons quite soon. Apart 
from that, it was the sincere desire of many actors in Ukraine to give up the nuclear 
weapons. This desire stemmed from the historical experience of Soviet oppression, which 
Ukrainians had endured, as well as the very strong anti-nuclear sentiments in the 
aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. Nevertheless it was only in January 1994 when the 
Trilateral Agreement between the USA, Russia and Ukraine was signed and in November 
of 1994 when Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.61 
Aside from all these conflicts and disagreements and misunderstandings, these 
nuclear negotiations in that period created basic personal and institutional links between 
the U.S. and Ukraine, beginning a pattern of U.S. engagement and cooperation with 
Ukraine. 
Overestimating the importance of this period of U.S.-Ukrainian relations is 
virtually impossible. Once the Trilateral Statement was signed, political ties between the 
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two countries rapidly expanded. The visit of President Kravchuk in Washington in 1994 
started the program of technical assistance. The election of Leonid Kuchma as president 
in the summer of 1994, and his economic reform added further momentum to the 
relationship. Ukraine became the third largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance. In 
1995 President Clinton himself visited Kiev.62 In September 1996, the U.S. and Ukraine 
agreed to create a bi-national commission, chaired by then Vice-President Al Gore and 
President Kuchma. That consisted of four committees dealing with foreign policy, 
security trade, and investment and economic issues. In October 1996 the two sides 
described their relations as "a strategic partnership." Though work continues on silos and 
delivery systems, the period after June 1996 can be genuinely characterized as a post- 
nuclear one, in which the shape of relationship will be determined by a broad set of 
political, economic and security issues—and not nuclear issues. 
Post-Nuclear Period. 
In December 1996 a NATO Ministerial communique stating the alliance's support 
for Ukrainian political and economic reform and acknowledging that, "the maintenance 
of Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is a crucial factor for 
stability and security in Europe." The U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation laid out the basic 
principles incorporated in the NATO-Ukraine chapter the following year. Ukraine has 
also joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, which broadly expanded defense 
and military contacts with the U.S., NATO, and other Westerns countries. 
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Ukraine's contribution to U.S. interests is also impressive. Ukraine has a growing 
technology exchange program with NASA and provided experiments for a Space Shuttle 
launch in October 1997 that included the first flight of a Ukrainian astronaut on a western 
space mission. In the nuclear field, Ukraine has cooperated closely with the U.S. and the 
G-7 to share the results of studies of the Chernobyl disaster and to deal with its 
aftermath.63 
With regard to European security, Ukraine has taken an active and eager role in 
shaping a more integrated, stable, and secure Europe. Ukraine has certainly built an 
impressive record of cooperation with NATO including the Partnership for Peace. 
Ukraine also has strengthened the stability in the region by reaching agreements with all 
its neighbors on the recognition of borders, as well as setting an unprecedented example 
for the world in eliminating nuclear arms, and other important bilateral issues. An 
important achievement was the harnessing of inflation—from hyperinflation in 1993— to 
a rate of 10% in 1997. However, the economy continues to contract and the transition to 
a market economy is still very much an unfinished process with more hardships ahead. 
Ukraine had an opportunity in 1998 to implement needed structural reform that 
could bring about long-term growth and attract foreign investments. The U.S. contributed 
to this effort through assistance programs and through actions, such as helping Ukraine 
toward accession to the World Trade Organization. The International Money Fund (IMF) 
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and the World Bank are also vital players in Ukraine's economic restructuring, providing 
significant loans and funds. 
One of the cornerstones for the continuing U.S. partnership with Ukraine is the 
Open Markets Support Act, enacted in October 1992. Ukraine has been a primary 
recipient of FSA assistance. Total U.S. assistance since Ukraine's independence has been 
over $2 billion. The total U.S. assistance in FY 2000 was $216 million, of which $169 
million was FSA funding.64 
The U.S. has also played a leading role in mobilizing support to help Ukraine 
cover its external financing gaps as it implements hard reform under IMF programs. The 
U.S. contribution in March 1995 helped support nearly $5 billion in IMF and other 
bilateral financing and debt relief. For just the first half of FY 1995, the U.S. coordinated 
and funded the delivery of $33 million in food, medical supplies, and clothing to Ukraine 
as humanitarian assistance.65 
In addition, Ukrainians have been invited to participate in a broad range of U.S. 
exchanges and training programs. These include: 
• Coal mine safety; 
• Nuclear reactor safety; 
• Privet land ownership and real estate markets; 
64
 U.S Department of State, US Aid Assistance to Ukraine, Available [on line]: 








Labor statistic and labor-management relations; 
Promotion of agricultural development; 
Public health and hospital management and finance; 
Security and defense conversion; 
International military education and training (IMET) 66 
One of the important statements made by President Clinton on meeting with 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma on June 5, 2000 in Kiev's summit was that Europe's 
eastern border does not end at Ukraine's western border. He said, "We feel that it's a 
fundamental principle of our foreign policy that Ukraine and its integration into European 
and Euro-Atlantic structures is in our national interest too." There are a number of very 
important achievements that were signed during this summit: 
• First and foremost was the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear plant on 
December 15,2000. In connection with this: 
• A U.S. pledge of $78 million for the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, which 
helped pay for a "sarcophagus" for the Chernobyl reactors; 
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• A $2 million Department of Energy nuclear safety program for Ukraine; 
• A new program called a "business incubator for the Chernobyl region" to 
help create new economic opportunities for people in that region. 
• The U.S. decision to eliminate commercial space-launch quotas with 
Ukraine because of Ukraine's stellar record on nonproliferation, especially 
in regard to missile technology. 
• A special agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine regarding Ukraine's 
most painful problem, "corruption." 
• Finally, the "nuclear fuel qualifying agreement," which will enable 
Ukraine to diversify its source of nuclear fuel and thereby cut its energy 
costs.67 
In short, a bond between Ukraine and the USA is very important for Ukraine, 
which seeks close relations with the U.S., NATO and other Western's countries, and also 
has significant influences on security and stability in Europe. 
In his speech in Berlin on May 13, 1998, President Bill Clinton said, "America 
stands with Europe. Today, no less than 50 years ago, our destinies are joined. If Europe 
is at peace, America is more secure. If Europe prospers, America does as well. We . . . 
move to a logic of mutually beneficial interdependence, where each nation can grow 
stronger and more prosperous because of the success of its neighbors and friends.... We 
67
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seek a transatlantic partnership that is broad and open in scope, where the benefits and 
burdens are shared, where we seek a stable and peaceful future not only for ourselves, but 
for all the world."68 Therefore, serious political and economic support and assistance, 
which Ukraine received from the U.S. in that period was a tremendous aid for Ukraine's 
rebirth of its own democracy and stability, the base for future relations, and an investment 
in the stability in the Europe. 
B. RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a process began of dividing the 
commonly held assets of the Soviet republics between the newly independent states. The 
two most important of these new states, Russia and Ukraine, had much to divide between 
them. Among the most important problems between the two countries were the transfer 
of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia, the final legal status of Crimea, and the possession 
of the Black Sea Fleet (hereafter denoted as "BSF") and its homeport of Sevastopol. 
Frighteningly, all of these issues had the potential to escalate into a crisis with violent 
consequences.69 
The development relationship between Ukraine and Russia had many difficulties, 
and especially in the first phase, when both Russian bravado, and Ukrainian "suicidal 
nationalism" influenced the process of negotiations.   At the beginning, in May-June 
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1990, when Russia declared its sovereignty, the Ukrainian-Russian relations enjoyed a 
brief and unprecedented honeymoon. The "Declaration of the Principles of Inter-State 
Relation between Ukraine and RSFSR Based on the Declaration of State Sovereignty" 
opened a "new era" in Ukrainian-Russian relations.70 This document affirmed several 
important principles: 
• The unconditional recognition of Ukraine and Russia as subjects of 
international law; 
• The "sovereign equality" of the two republics; 
• The principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs and 
renunciation of force in their dealings; 
• The inviolability of existing state borders between the two republics and 
the renunciation of any and all territorial claims; 
• The safe guarding of the political, economic, ethnic, and cultural rights of 
the representatives of nations of the RSFSR living in Ukraine and vice 
versa; 
• The desirability of mutual beneficial cooperation in various fields on the 
basis of inter-state treaties and the regulations of disputes in a spirit of 
harmony." 71 
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These were the basic principles of the formal treaty between Ukraine and Russia 
signed on 19 November 1990. 
In 1947 Russian philosopher and scientist Georgiy Fedotov wrote, "The 
awakening of Ukraine, and especially the character of Ukrainians, surprised the Russians 
intelligentsia, and we were never able to understand it. This was first of all, because we 
loved Ukraine, we loved her land, her people, her song, and we thought that all this was 
also part of our national heritage. Also, the separatism was incomprehensible to us 
because we had never really been interested in the three to four centuries of history that 
had formed the Ukrainian people and their culture different from the Great Russians." 
The Ukrainian national problem is for Russia more important than any other national 
question. This is not a question only about Russia's structure or borders, for we are here 
talking about her soul." 
According to the nationwide poll conducted in Russia in the fall of 1997 by the 
Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 56 percent of respondents felt that Ukrainians 
and Russians are "one people." A large segment of the Russian population, and certainly 
much of political class, the cultural elites, still continue to view Ukraine as an integral 
part of the Russian nation.73   In November 1997 President Yeltsin voiced the same point 
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in an address to his countrymen, "It is impossible to tear from our hearts that Ukrainians 
are our own people. That is our destiny—our common destiny." 
All of these statements clearly demonstrate that a significant spectrum of public 
opinion (including politicians, the elite, and commoners) continue to view the separation 
of Ukraine as something "artificial and temporary." Therefore, the Ukrainian-Russians 
"divorce" was different or more complicated than the other divorces that occurred at the 
end of 1991. Of course, such opinions seriously influence the behavior of politicians and 
entice them to attach Ukraine to Russia once again or to any union like the CIS, at all 
costs. A more serious concern was that Ukraine was necessary for Russia's self- 
affirmation, and for Russia to become a "Great Empire" again. Such a mentality may 
have led Russia to attempt to dominate or control the situation from within the former 
Soviet Union. The first serious conflict between Ukraine and Russia took place after 
Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August 1991. Yeltsin's press secretary, in 
his speech, neglected the "Declaration of the Principles of Inter-State Relation between 
Ukraine and RSFSR," by means of statement that Russia reserved the right to raise the 
border issue with those republics (except three Baltic states), which declared their 
independence and discontinued union relations. 
"If these Republics enter the Union with Russia," he explained, 'it is not a 
problem. But if they go, we must take care of the population that lives there and not 
forget that Russians settled these lands.' Russia will hardly agree to give away these 
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territories just like that."74 This statement had a significant influence on Ukrainian 
politicians. Ukrainians leaders feared that the Russian government might try to bring 
Ukraine to its knees. Therefore, Kravchuk maintained in August 1991, that Ukraine could 
not work on the new Union treaty with Russia until after its referendum on independence. 
Later, in Belovezha, Kravchuk refused to sign the existing draft of the treaty and to 
propose his own version of the treaty. An agreement between Russia, Byelorussia, and 
Ukraine was created as a result.75 After that, Ukraine and Russia continued to drift apart. 
According to Foreign Minister Udovenko in his speech to President Kuchma in 1995, 
"Russia has no intention to build its relation with CIS countries in line with international 
law, nor to respect the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference 
in domestic affairs.... In fact, this means undermining that CIS countries will subordinate 
their activity to Russia's interests restoring the centralized superpower." 
So quite clearly, from the beginning, Ukraine and Russia had very different views 
as to the nature and purpose of the CIS. For Ukraine the CIS was a necessary mechanism 
for an orderly "divorce process," "a transitional body," for alienation from Russia. 
Ukraine refused to take part in any CIS initiatives aimed at greater integration in the 
political, military, and security spheres. Thus, Ukraine did not sign the collective security 
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treaty in Tashkent in May 1992.77 Accordingly, to establish security and independence, 
Ukraine attempts to learn toward the West and NATO in its foreign policy, understanding 
that NATO would help Ukraine reach its aims. - 
In November 1990, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement to respect each 
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on December 8, 1992, Ukraine became a 
member of the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Yet from 
the start of the decade, Ukraine's relations with Russia were strained due to its concern 
over Russia's intentions. In January 1993 Ukraine refused to endorse a draft charter 
strengthening political, economic, and defense ties among CIS members. 78 In many 
respects, Ukraine's position clearly illustrates the well known "return of geography," 
since its policies have from the start been dominated by external factors. Since its 
independence, Kiev has oriented itself toward the West (with the slogan Nasha Meta: 
Evropal—Our goal: Europe!), trying to forge close ties with Western and Central Europe, 
as well as with the United States. Reality, however, has also made it necessary for 
Ukraine to maintain close economic, and hence political, links with its former hegemon. 
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Ukraine's security predicament results mainly from its precarious geographical situation: 
it is a peripheral country for the West as well as for Russia. 
The harsh economic realities, the dependent Ukrainian economy, from Russia and 
Russian's source of energy, and the inability or unwillingness of Ukrainian leaders to 
develop a program of market reforms raise the question of economical relation with 
Russia. An important factor in this situation was the election of Leonid Kuchma as 
President of Ukraine. He said, "Anti-Russian actions in politics led to anti-Ukrainian 
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economic consequences. 
After the elections, Kuchma did not accomplish the promises that he made during 
the campaign about developing close relations with Russia, but "suicidal nationalism" 
and strong abnormal anti-Russian policy, which was very dangerous first of all for 
Ukrainian integrality, in regards of deep dividing of Ukrainian society, was stopped. 
After 1994, Ukraine increasingly moved toward a more balanced foreign policy 
between West and East. The Trilateral Statement on denuclearization in January 1994, 
paved the way for more widely developed relations between Ukraine and West, and in 
the following month Ukraine became the first country from the CIS to sign NATO's 
Partnership for Peace Program. The BSF negotiations revolved around three primary 
issues: division of the warships into a truncated Russian BSF and a Ukrainian navy, 
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Russian naval basing rights in and around the Crimean port city of Sevastopol, and the 
larger question of which country had ultimate sovereign control over the peninsula. The 
ships were never the key issue. While at one time a "jewel of the former Soviet navy," the 
BSF was by 1995, "both small and old, with the newest of the 635 vessels built 17 years 
ago." Sherman Game« points out in his book on Ukraine and its security environment 
that over the past few decades the BSF: 
has been a waning force incapable of performing the role Soviet 
defense planners assigned it in the Mediterranean against the U.S. 
6th Fleet and other NATO assets... The real military tasks it must 
perform in small-scale conflicts and coastal defense do not warrant 
maintenance of the current Fleet and support facilities.81 
Ukraine and Russia were claiming sovereign control over Sevastopol and the 
Crimean peninsula. As one New York Times article notes, the BSF problem, "was always 
more of a political issue than a strategic one. Ukraine and Russia could have gone to war 
over the fleet—not over the actual strategic value of the ships in harbor, but over 
Ukraine's desire for complete independence from Russia and for Russia's want to 
maintain some control in the Soviet successor states." 
In the background of all the BSF negotiations was the status of Crimea, a 
peninsula butting into the Black Sea from Ukraine's south shore. Crimea, an area with a 
81
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large ethnic Russian population, famous resorts, and a naval base, was handed to Ukraine 
as a meaningless gesture of friendship in 1954 by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to 
mark the 300th anniversary of Ukrainian union with Russia." 83 The home base for BSF's 
was the famous port city of Sevastopol. The problem of a new border became salient after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, as Russian began regular demands that Crimea be 
returned to Russia, along with the BSF and its base.84 Ethnic tensions in 1992 prompted 
some to advocate for the secession of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to Russia. 
In July 1992, the Crimean and Ukrainian parliaments determined that Crimea would 
remain under Ukrainian jurisdiction while retaining significant cultural and economic 
autonomy."85 
Yet, the ethnic issue still brewed. Crimea's first presidential elections in January 
1994 resulted in the election of Yuri Meshkov, a member of the Republican Party of 
Crimea advocating closer ties to Russia. Disputes over the BSF began with both Ukraine 
and Russia taking extreme positions. At a January 1992 press conference the Ukrainian 
Ministers of State and Defense Antonov and Morozov declared that the BSF was always 
and will remain Ukrainian. At a March 1992 CIS summit in Kiev, a contentious bilateral 
meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid 
83
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Kravchuk brought no progress. In April, tensions rose to a crisis level as Kravchuk 
unilaterally announced the formation of a Ukrainian navy to be based in Crimea. 
Kravchuk and Yeltsin were able to defuse the crisis, however, and put aside a 
week of brinkmanship. In two phone conversations the two presidents agreed to suspend 
their countries' respective decrees claiming the force for themselves and formed a 
commission to resolve the dispute.86 By the end of the month Russian and Ukrainian 
negotiators opened two days of talks in Odessa over April 29-30 on how to divide the 
BSF. The Russian delegation proposed a moratorium on any unilateral action that could 
aggravate the situation around the BSF, with a joint commission of Russian and 
Ukrainian representatives established to monitor the moratorium. The Ukrainians 
agreed. After that, there were several meetings, and several attempts to solve these 
problems: in Dagomys on June 23; the agreement signed in Yalta on August 3, 1992; the 
Massandra Agreement on September 3 1993; active negotiations after the summer ofl994 
(after the Kuchma elections); the attempt to involve the U.S. as a mediator in February 
1995 was refused by Russia; the Sochi Agreement in June when Yeltsin told reporters 
afterward that the signing "finally put a period on this question once and for all," and 
Kuchma, said, "Although some detailed issues remain, I consider this question solved in 
general." Perhaps his most important comment was, " Ukraine and Russia really agreed 
on a strategic partnership."   A meeting in Barvikha on October 24, 1996, characterized 
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by Kuchma's comment, "We did not reach any new agreements.... We simply confirmed 
oo 
the past decision that was adopted on a government level." 
This period may be characterized by Irina Kobrinskaya. She said the touchy issue 
of Sevastopol was ignored because, "Neither Yeltsin nor Kuchma can afford to make a 
final decision. The political situation is not ready." During this period, both sides were 
seeking to achieve their own aims very slowly, sometimes taking a step back, but this 
period prepared both sides for the series of conciliatory steps taken by both sides in April 
of 1997. Ukrainian PM Pavlo Lazarenko and Russian PM Chernomyrdin signed the final 
BSF accords in Kiev on May 28, 1997. Ukraine agreed to have its navy participate in 
joint operational-strategic exercises with the Russian BSF, and Yeltsin's government 
simply ignored yet another appeal from the Duma to demand "special territorial status" 
for Sevastopol.89 
After five years of public posturing, stalemates, and stop-and-go diplomatic 
negotiations, Ukraine and Russia reached an agreement. While it was expected that 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin would sign the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Partnership, few senior Ukrainian officials believed that a separate BSF 
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agreement could be reached. It was also surprising that Moscow had accepted conditions 
similar to those it had rejected in October 1996.90 
Briefly, the accords outline an agreement whereby: 
1) The two nations split the BSF 50-50 with Russia to buy back some of 
the more modern ships with cash; 
2) Russia would lease the ports in and around Sevastopol for 20 years at 
$97.75 million per year. Russia would also credit Ukraine with $526 
million for the use of part of the fleet, as well as $200 million for the 1992 
transfer of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal to Russia. The payments would go 
toward reducing Ukraine's $3 billion debt to Russia (most of which was 
owed to the Russian gas supplier RAO Gazprom); and 
3) Crimea (and the city of Sevastopol, built 214 years ago to proclaim the 
Russian Empire's eternal dominion over the seas3) became legally and 
territorially a sovereign part of Ukraine.91 
These were the most important steps in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, and 
today it seems that the BSF issue is settled, at least for the next few decades. Russia and 
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Ukraine have an opportunity to ease their remaining tension and fully normalize their 
relations, and when the time comes again to negotiate the future of the BSF, it will 
hopefully be a more mundane affair. 
Today, the real problem facing Ukraine is not ethnic tension between the Russian 
and Ukrainian population or between Russia and Ukraine. It is the economic problem. 
Resolving this problem is impossibility for Ukraine without the economic cooperation of 
Russia, without Russia's energy and market.92 
The developing economic relations between the two countries from 1994 to the 
end of 1999 have a mixed impact. On the one hand, increased trade since mid-1995, the 
emergence of a mixed business community with vested interests not being interrupted by 
worsened political relations, and Ukraine's new interest in expanding economic 
cooperation within the CIS are all factors that have had a stabilizing effect on the 
relationship, (including the Crimean question and the BSF.) 
On the other hand, Ukraine is continuing to fear Russia's attempts to undermine 
its independence, either by trying to coerce Ukraine into economic communities it does 
not want to join, or by means of "imperial businessmen" buying up Ukrainian 
enterprises. Ukraine also fears Russia's impatience with what it sees as half-hearted 
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economic integration. Both these issues contribute to the continued mistrust between the 
countries.93 
In short, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, during its development has 
traveled a long and winding way, with some success and some failure, but now these two 
proud and deserving nations are quite close to forming normal relationships, which must 
exist between neighboring countries with a common historical heritage. Yet, these 
relations must not cast any negative influences on Ukraine's real pro-Western orientation 
and movement toward European integration. 
93Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p.83 
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V.      CONCLUSION* 
Ukraine today is confidently striding on the road toward consistent democratic 
transformation and economic reforms. The nation is solving painful social and security 
problems while completing its transition to a market economy. 
Unfortunately, non-democratic events sometimes still occur in Ukraine, 
demonstrating that the political society is still weak and many political and economic 
reforms are still necessary to bolster the inadequacies in these institutions. Nevertheless, 
Ukraine reaffirmed its historic choices in favor of independence and sovereignty, 
continuing reforms, building a market economy, strengthening democracy and promoting 
supremacy of the law. Political pluralism, freedom of speech, movement and enterprise, 
private ownership in agricultural and industry, the growing number of public unions, 
encouraging the free activity of political parties, as well as other democratic freedoms, 
with only minor exceptions, have become the essence of Ukrainian society. 
All these factors will enhance its competitiveness and accelerate Ukraine's 
integration into the European economic and political space with the ultimate goal of 
acquiring a status of associate EU member and full membership in the European society. 
The experience Ukraine has gained during nine years of independence has proved that its 
foreign policy course has adequately promoted and protected the national interests of the 
state in the international arena. Today its foreign policy has become an important and 
integral part of the reformation. This policy is one of the instruments for ensuring 
* In this chapter, which a reviews the thesis, I have used materials from the article: "Ukraine: nine years of 
independence". August 23, 2000. Available [on line]: [http.//www.un.intAJkraine/pres-rel/2000/pr-r- 
0823.htm], December 2000 
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economic growth and for guaranteeing the welfare of the population, which are the keys 
to a prosperous future. 
Ukraine is confidently strengthening its position in the international arena and the 
scope of its relations with the world is expanding. Ukraine's voice is finally being heard 
in international organizations. Ukraine was elected to the UN Security Council for the 
period 2000-2001 representing the Eastern European countries. 
Ukraine's cooperation with NATO has become an important factor for reaching 
these complex goals and for strengthening its own stability and security, as well as the 
stability and security of all Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The partnership with the 
Alliance is promoting mutual confidence in the region. Active development of good- 
neighborly relations with the Alliance member states and candidates for NATO 
membership, along with unprecedented basic bilateral agreements with those countries, 
made it possible to address the controversial issues inherited from the past and thus to lay 
a firm foundation for regional stability. 
The joint activity of Ukraine and NATO has become a crucial instrument for 
stabilizing South and Eastern Europe—earlier in Bosnia and Herzegovina and now in 
Kosovo. In Kosovo a Joint Ukrainian-Polish Battalion peacekeeping union was formed. 
There are now grounds for believing that soon the unique experience of this 
peacekeeping unit will be employed for the Ukrainian-Hungarian-Romanian-Slovakian 
engineer battalion and for the BLACKSEAFOR, which is expected to become an 
important element in regional security. 
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This cooperation with NATO facilitates Ukraine's participation in building a new 
system of European security. This cooperation, particularly Ukrainian units in the 
multinational peacekeeping contingents IFOR/SFOR/KFOR along with the joint 
exercises of the Partnership for Peace Program, help to raise combat preparedness of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces. Significantly, the NATO member countries provide essential 
financial and logistic assistance to the Ukrainian troops that perform their peacekeeping 
mission in Kosovo. 
Further development and deepening of the strategic partnership with NATO and 
the United States of America occupies an important place among Ukraine's foreign 
policy priorities. During the ninth year of Ukraine's independence, the US-Ukrainian 
relations—marked by high dynamism—generated valuable practical results. 
The visit of the President of the United States to Ukraine on July 5, 2000 was a 
landmark event in the US-Ukrainian relations. That visit testified that the United States 
supported the program of reforms introduced in Ukraine and confirmed that the strategic 
partnership is oriented toward broadening bilateral cooperation. 
At the same time, relations between Ukraine and Russia entered a new phase and 
new approaches were needed to address the remaining issues. Having comprehensively 
analyzed the state of Ukrainian-Russian cooperation, the leaders reaffirmed their desire to 
establish a level of relations that was defined earlier as a "strategic partnership." They 
agreed that temporary economic problems should not have a negative impact on that 
partnership. 
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At the recent session of the CIS Council held in Moscow on June 20 and 21, 
2000, Ukraine presented an initiative to create a free-trade zone. The Council endorsed 
this initiative. Thus Ukraine's approach toward the CIS has proven to be productive and 
realistic, for it is not supra-national structures that can create a viable Commonwealth, 
but instead the ability of leaders to modernize and to adapt to the new environment by 
creating favorable conditions for trade, and economic and cultural cooperation. 
Relationships with Westerns countries and NATO helped Ukraine obtain all of 
these encouraging results. The special relationship with NATO and the bilateral relation 
with the USA are helping to confirm Ukrainian independence and its movement to an 
authentic democratic society, and also to confirm its own domestic and external abilities 
to maintain its security. It was vital for Ukraine to finalize this mutually beneficial 
relationship with NATO and bilateral relations with the USA. Ukrainian politicians well 
understand that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European 
and Western political, economic, and military community. An objective analysis shows 
that developing such bonds between Ukraine and NATO in the future, such as including 
Ukraine in the present NATO enlargement proposal could provide: 
• Expansion of the Stability Zone in Europe.   Since the NATO area is 
now the most stable region in Europe, close relations with NATO could 
mean enlarging this region of stability. 
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• A Smooth Transition for Ukraine to a Democracy. A union between 
Ukraine and NATO can only lead to closer relations to the entire region of 
Western Europe. 
• A Smooth Transition for Ukraine to a Market Economy. Such 
relations in the political and economic spheres could allow Ukraine to 
develop a broader range of economic relations and reduce its need to be so 
strongly orientated to the CIS, economically or otherwise. 
Yet, for a more successful transition, Ukraine still needs to resolve several 
challenging problems. First of all, it must reshape or create a more active and stronger 
political society in the country. Secondly, Ukraine must increase the acceptance of 
Western society and NATO among its population by explaining the policies of these 
Western institutions and justifying the benefits that Ukraine could obtain from these 
institutions. Third, Ukraine needs real economic reforms, principally a market economy 
capable of generating economic growth. One essential element for reaching these goals is 
establishing balanced economic relations with Russia. The final, and perhaps one of the 
most complex barriers to Ukraine's transition, is the political and civil corruption that 
wears away, both internally and externally, the confidence and hope of everyone involved 
in this situation. Only with the help of Western society, its exemplary judicial system 
and others governmental and political structures can Ukraine battle this malignancy and 
create an authentic democratic society. 
By continuing to create and implement documents of cooperation with NATO, 
such as the Ukraine-NATO Chapter of 1997, "The Government Program of Cooperation 
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between Ukraine and NATO: 2000 to 2004" and similar agreements, Ukraine will 
promote its independence, strengthen its statehood, improve its living standards, reduce 
social tension and secure further democratic development, as the deserving Ukrainian 
people demanded when they declared their independence on August 24,1991. 
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